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Collective Bargaining and Unpaid Care as Social
Security Risk: An EU Perspective
Dagmar SCHIEK*
This article contributes to the debate on how collective agreements can enhance social security from
the perspective of unpaid care work. It defines the risk of giving up employment in favour of
unpaid care as a social security risk (the care risk). It analyses how collective agreements in the
EU can address this risk without compromising gender equality. The analysis is conducted with a
focus on analysing the risks emerging from European Union law on a regulatory practice yet to
emerge: the inclusion of institutional (child) care provisions in collective agreements. The article
concludes that it is disruptive for innovative collective bargaining strategies if interpreted from a
standpoint focusing merely on economic integration.
Keywords: Occupational Social Security, Work-Life Balance, EU Competition Law, Collectively
Agreed (Child) Care Institutions, European Union, EU Law
1 INTRODUCTION
Policy reactions to the Covid-19 pandemic have unexpectedly highlighted the
relevance of unpaid care obligations for continuity of employment: the closure of
schools and other childcare institutions, and the ban on in-house care, have led to
many parents reducing their working hours or, if working from home, facing a
new reality of multitasking. If any evidence were needed, this demonstrates that
the lack of care for children or elderly relatives will induce individuals, especially
women, to give up or cut down on paid work in favour of unpaid care work.1
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1 For first assessments on parental labour market drop-outs see Titan M. Alon et al., The Impact of Covid
19 on Gender Equality, NBER Working Paper Series (2020, For the USA); Jonas Jessen & Sevrin
Waights, Effects of COVID-19 Day Care Centre Closures on Parental Time Use: Evidence from Germany,
Vox CEPR Policy Portal (2020), https://voxeu.org/article/covid-19-day-care-centre-closures-and-
parental-time-use; Claudia Hupkau & Barbara Perongolo, Work, Care and Gender During the Covid-19
Crisis, London: Centre for Economic Performance (2020, for the UK), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/cepcovid-19-002.pdf; Abi Adams-Prassl et al., Inequality in the Impact of the Coronavirus
However, the risk of losing or reducing paid employment in favour of unpaid care
work is not conventionally addressed as a social security risk, nor is it at the centre
of debates on using collective agreements to provide or complement social security
provision, either at sectoral or company level.
The geographical scope of this study is Europe, more specifically the European
Union. Both social security and collective bargaining first developed in Europe,
where collective bargaining has developed into a complex multipolar system, in
which national and subnational law and practice interact with European Union law
and policy.2 The role of EU law and policy is contradictory: while in the initial
phases of European integration, there was a general expectation that the Common
Market would result in a European industrial relations system,3 today national and
sub-national industrial relations systems co-exist with EU-level industrial relations
in a multi-level governance scenario4 with increasing disruption from EU law and
policy.5
The article argues that the care risk can be defined as a new social security risk,
building on the European tradition of social security, and that in principle it is not
beyond the reach of collective bargaining. It derives from the extensive literature
on work-life balance and gender equality that the provision of (child) care is
particularly suitable for dealing with that risk. After identifying the initial cautious
steps to integrate the provision of childcare into collective bargaining, it examines
the question of whether and to what extent institutions set up by the social partners
in collective agreements are vulnerable to challenges under EU competition and
internal market law (EU economic law). Evidence is provided in support of the
hypothesis that EU economic law is disruptive for innovative collective bargaining
strategies if interpreted from a standpoint focusing merely on economic
integration.
The next section contextualizes the argument within debates on work-life
balance, gender equality and collectively agreed social security measures, identify-
ing the extent to which it contributes innovative concepts. Section III examines
Shock: Evidence from Real Time Surveys, IZA Discussion Paper (2020, several countries), https://www.
iza.org/publications/dp/13183/inequality-in-the-impact-of-the-coronavirus-shock-evidence-from-
real-time-surveys (accessed 29 May 2020).
2 See recently Bengt Furåker & Bengt Larsson, Trade Union Cooperation in Europe: Patterns, Conditions,
Issues 14–16 (Palgrave Pivot 2020).
3 John T. Dunlop, Industrial Relations Systems 75 (Holt 1958); Gerda Falkner, EU Social Policy in the
1990s: Towards a Corporatist Policy Community 196–197 (Routledge 1998).
4 Maarten Keune & Paul Marginson, Transnational Industrial Relations as Multi-Level Governance:
Interdependencies in European Social Dialogue, 51 (3) Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 473 (2013).
5 Sergio González Begega & Mona Aranea, The Establishing of a European Industrial Relations System: Still
Under Construction or Chasing a Chimera?, 40 (4) Emp. Rel. 600, 611–614 (2018); Paul Marginson,
Work and Employment Relations in an Internationalized Economy, 69(5) ILR Rev. 1033, 1040–1041,
1045–1047 (2016).
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the aspect of the care challenge that can be defined as a social security risk, homing
in on childcare, and the provision of childcare institutions as the most promising
way of addressing the care risk. Section IV discusses whether addressing the (child)
care risk is a suitable matter for collective bargaining. Section V reports on initial
attempts in European industrial relations to address the (child) care challenge, and
identifies the risks emanating from EU competition law for establishing those
institutions by collective agreement.
2 CONTEXT
2.1 WORK-LIFE BALANCE, UNPAID CARE WORK AND GENDER EQUALITY
IN EMPLOYMENT
Only a brief overview can be provided of the extensive literature on work-life
balance, gender equality and the distribution of unpaid care work. The debate on
the ethics of care and working life casts light on the ubiquity of caring in human
interaction, and analyses how unequal responsibility for care can cause imbalance
of opportunities in any setting, including the workplace.6 Other approaches ques-
tion the ability of capitalism to integrate care7 or provide a feminist analysis of how
welfare states respond to emerging care risks.8 The question of whether unpaid
care work should be redistributed between women and men, or replaced as far as
possible by paid care work, has divided generations of feminists.9 Extreme posi-
tions include those who suggest reserving care work for women while increasing
its moral and economic appreciation and those who insist that women should resist
the expectation to take on unpaid care work in order to improve their
employability.10 The middle ground is occupied by those who demand that both
6 Martha Fineman, The Autonomy Myth (The New Press 2004); Jonathan Herring, Caring and the Law
(Hart 2013); for an overview of the debate see Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella & Annick Masselot,
Caring Responsiblities in EU Law and Policy 44–49 (Routledge 2020).
7 Nancy Fraser, Contradictions of Capital and Care, 100 New Left Rev. 99 (2016).
8 Rosella Ciccia & Diane Sainsbury, Gendering Welfare State Analysis: Tensions Between Care and Paid
Work, 1(1–2) Eur. J. Pol. & Gender 93 (2018).
9 See for an overview from US perspectives Joan Williams, ‘It’s Snowing Down South’: How to Help
Mothers and Avoid Recycling the Sameness/Difference Debate, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 812 (2002), from
European perspectives Caracciolo di Torella & Masselot, supra n. 6, at 33–38.
10 Swedish authors represent a European variety of the latter, by openly referring to the potential loss of
societal investment due to promoting housewifery: ‘Since women are at least as educated as men, the
single-breadwinner model has also led to a plethora of highly educated housewives in Europe. This is
an expensive arrangement, both for society and individual families. Society invests in the education of
people who then disappear from the labour market for long periods, with the attendant high risk that
their knowledge will become obsolete (…) Employers will be reluctant to employ or invest in women
if they assume that they will leave work as soon as they have children. The single-breadwinner model
also makes families more vulnerable to the risk (…) (of) unemployment and illness’. Annelie
Nordström, A Holistic Approach to the Provision of Care: A Key Ingredient for Economic Independence, in
Visions for Gender Equality 45 (Francesca Bettio & Silvia Sansonetti, eds European Commission 2015).
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parents be supported by maternity/paternity and parental leave entitlements with
continuity of pay or benefits, while having access to high-quality care services, in
order to redistribute unpaid care work evenly.11 While the policy debate on the
remunerated work of mothers (parents) is as old as industrial work,12 increasing life
expectancy gives rise to new expectations to take up unpaid elder care once
children have outgrown the need for unpaid care.13 These debates have recently
led to a new EU Directive requiring Member States to provide unpaid leave for
elder care in addition to benefits for paternal and parental leave,14 preceded and
followed by intense debate.15
This article builds on the results of these debates rather than engaging with
them. The evidence provided in the academic debate confirms that the lower
engagement of women in remunerated work globally is partially due to the
expectation that all women undertake significant amounts of unpaid care. While
some hail a ‘shift to equal parenting’ in families,16 current statistics show that such a
shift is excruciatingly slow.17 Academic studies commissioned by the International
Labour Organization (ILO),18 in addition to those conducted by the OECD19 and
policy reports for the EU,20 confirm that a combination of expanding acceptable
child day-care institutions and reducing the cumulated time mothers spend on
11 For example, Caracciolo di Torella & Masselot, supra n. 6; Jill Rubery & Aristea Koukidiakis, Closing
the Gender Pay Gap. A Review of the Issues, Policy Mechanisms and International Evidence (International
Labour Office 2016), for some data supporting the combination of medium length maternity leave
with full compensation for lost earnings with comprehensive provision of non-familial childcare see
Gender, Equality and Diversity & ILOAIDS, Care Work and Care Jobs for the Future of Decent Work 83–
95, 119–120 (International Labour Office 2018).
12 The ILO recently celebrated the 100th anniversary of the first ILO convention on maternity protec-
tion. The resulting report again recommended to increase institutional childcare provision as one of
the main preconditions for improved equality. International Labour Organization, A Quantum Leap for
Gender Equality: For a Better Future of Work for All 12, 77–88 (International Labour Office 2019).
13 Katharina Herlofson & Martina Brandt, Helping Older Parents in Europe: The Importance of
Grandparenthood, Gender and Care Regime, 22 (Advance Article) European Societies (2019), doi.org/
10.1080/14616696.2019.1694163.
14 Directive (EU) 2019/1158 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on work-
life balance for parents and carers and repealing Council Directive 2010/18/EU, OJ L 188/79 of 12
July 2019.
15 Denis Bouget et al., Towards New Work-Life Balance Policies for Those Caring for Dependent Relatives, in
Social Policy in the European Union: State of Play 155 (Bart Vanhercke et al. eds, European Trade Union
Institute 2017); Chieregato, A Work-Life Balance for All? Assessing the Inclusiveness of EU Directive 2019/
1158, 36(1) ICL 59 (2020); Ivana Isailovic, Gender Equality as Investment: EU Work-Life Balance and the
Neoliberal Shift, (forthcoming) Yale J. Int’l L. (SSRN 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3523289
(accessed 29 May 2020), for a rejection of compulsory maternity leave under EU law see (Miguel de
la Corte Rodrıguez, EU Directives on Maternity Leave: A Misleading Social Risk Approach and Its
Unsatisfactory Effects on Both Mothers and Fathers, 9(2) Eur. Lab. L. J. 171 (2018)), see also Jenny Julén
Votinius in this issue, text around fn. 6–7.
16 Joan Williams et.al., Beyond Work-Life ‘Integration’, 65 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 515 (2015).
17 Gender, Equality and Diversity & ILOAIDS, supra n. 11.
18 Rubery & Koukidiakis, supra n. 11.
19 OEDC, Closing the Gender Gap: Act Now, 202–203, 210–214 (OECD Publishing 2012).
20 Visions for Gender Equality (Francesca Bettio & Silvia Sansonetti eds, European Commission 2015).
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maternity and parental leave will best contribute to securing women’s position in
paid employment. It is also necessary for acceptable care services to be available for
older people. The difference compared to children is that older persons have lived
a long life in which they have been able to pay into social insurance, which can
then ensure access to care or the refund of care costs.21
2.2 GENDER EQUALITY POLICY AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The trade unions have increasingly engaged with policies on work-life balance and
care. Traditionally, collective agreements have preceded or complemented legisla-
tion granting maternity leave or parental leave, occasionally with compensation for
loss of earnings.22 These collective bargaining strategies attract the same criticism as
legislative policies providing for maternity leave and/or parental leave: in particular
US authors underline how generous leave policies in Europe may increase female
employment at the price of limiting equal access for women to more qualified
positions.23 Further, the ambiguity of including the entitlement to request leave,
part-time work or flexibilization of working time in collective agreements is
illustrated by the role of those measures in the discourse on flexicurity: the will-
ingness of parents to reduce pay by working less, or more flexibly, constitutes the
main example for the interest of employees in flexibility, while staff retention
represents the main example of the interest of employers in security.24 In the
flexicurity matrix, the term ‘combination security’ indicates the flexibility gain for
the employee of being able to take leave instead of having to exit the labour
market.25 However, leave entitlements also induce employees to forgo remuner-
ated work in favour of providing unpaid care, thus enhancing the flexibility gains
of employers.26 More traditional collective bargaining measures, such as limiting
daily and weekly hours of paid employment may indirectly promote a fairer
division of unpaid care by enhancing every adult’s opportunity to engage in unpaid
21 See already Jozef Pacolet et al., Social Protection for Dependency in Old Age (Ashgate 2000) more
expansively Aug. Österle & Heinz Rothgang, Long-Term Care, in The Oxford Handbook of the
Welfare State 378 (Francis G. Castles et al. eds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, OUP 2010).
22 For a recent overview see Daniela Ceccon & Iftikar Ahmad, Do Collective Bargaining Agreements Increase
Equality and Promote Work-life Balance? Evidence from the WageIndicator Database (Leuven, Industrial
Relations in Europe Conference 2018), see also Jenny Julén Votinius in this issue for the practice in
Sweden.
23 Nordström, supra n. 10; Ann Shola Orloff, Gender, in The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State 252
(Francis G. Castles et al. eds, OUP 2010).
24 Per Kongshøj Madsen, Flexicurity: A New Perspective on Labour Markets and Welfar States in Europe, 14
(1&2) Tilburg L. Rev. 57, 57–58 (1997).
25 Paul Marginson & Manuela Galetto, Engaging with Flexibility and Security: Rediscovering the Role of
Collective Bargaining, 37(1) Econ. & Indus. Democracy 95, 102 (2016).
26 On resulting critique of the EU flexicurity strategy see Jill Rubery & Gail Hebson, Applying a Gender
Lens to Employment Relations, 60(3) J. Indus. Rel. 414, 419–420 (2018).
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care.27 Strict limits on paid employment also remove the illusion of the ‘unen-
cumbered worker’,28 i.e. the idea that employees are truly free to dedicate so many
hours to paid employment that no time remains to care for their own
reproduction.
The pursuit of gender equality through collective bargaining goes beyond
reconciling paid employment and unpaid care work. Lower pay for women (often
referred to as the gender pay gap) is not exclusively attributable to the need to
provide unpaid care. Bargaining for gender equality most certainly encompasses
bargaining for equal pay, complemented or replaced by litigation strategies
depending on national tradition.29 Bargaining for equality may also include agree-
ments on specific equality plans, as required by French legislation at company-
level. In addition, bargaining for equality may include attempts to lay down
minimum requirements for atypical employment contracts.30
Collective bargaining for gender equality is also narrower than reconciliation
of this kind. Equal pay and equal treatment are not usually pursued exclusively for
those wishing to undertake unpaid care work. Addressing the desire of an increas-
ing proportion of men to actively participate in unpaid care goes beyond gender
equality. Establishing childcare institutions also has a wider effect on family life, as
highlighted by the closure of childcare institutions in the current pandemic.
2.3 OCCUPATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY AS A FIELD FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Reconciliation is only one of the four risks addressed by occupational welfare
programmes.31 The literature on the potential for collective bargaining agreements
to step into the void left by welfare state entrenchment, and in particular the
27 Eurofund, Working Time Patterns for Sustainable Work 2, 39–43, (Publication Office of the European
Union 2017).
28 Caracciolo di Torella & Masselot, supra n. 6, at 35–37.
29 In the UK equal pay principles were first introduced through collective bargaining (Simon Deakin et
al., Are Litigation and Collective Bargaining Complements or Substitutes for Achieving Gender Equality? A
study of the British Equal Pay Act, 39(2) Cambridge J. Econ. 381–403 (2015)); on the role of strategic
litigation in other countries see Gesine Fuchs, Strategic Litigation for Gender Equality in the Workplace and
Legal Opportunity Structures in Four European Countries, 28(2) Can. J. L. & Soc. 189 (2013). The general
impact of unionization and collective bargaining on the gender pay gap varies (Alex Bryson et al.,
Gender Differences in the Union Wage Premium? A Comparative Case Study, 26(2) Eur. J. Indus. Rel. 173
(2020)).
30 Pierre Courtioux & Christine Erhel, Is France Converging or Not? The role of Industrial Relations, in
Towards Convergence in Europe. Institutions, Labour and Industrial Relations 101, 112 (Daniel Vaughan-
Whitehead ed., Edward Elgar 2019); Gerhard Bosch, Does the German Social Model Support the
Convergence of Living Conditions in the EU, in Towards Convergence in Europe: Institutions, Labour and
Industrial Relations 139, 154–157 (Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead ed., Edward Elgar 2019).
31 David Natali et al., Occupational Welfare in Europe: Risks, Opportunities and Social Partner Involvement, 241
(European Trade Union Institute 2018).
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reduction of social insurance benefits, has been burgeoning,32 at times stressing the
potential of collective bargaining to contribute in innovative ways to inclusive
growth.33 The limits laid down by EU economic freedoms and competition rules
for collectively agreed pension schemes have recently re-emerged in response to
the increasing relevance of occupational welfare.34
2.4 THE CONTRIBUTION BEYOND THE CONTEXT
The ensuing discussion moves beyond these contextual debates.
First, it presents a fresh perspective by conceptualizing the care risk from the
perspective of the person who is challenged to give up remunerated work in favour
of unpaid labour, while becoming economically dependent on family relations.
Traditionally, the care risk is viewed as a macroeconomic risk, best avoided by
activating the family support regime, potentially creating dependency.
Second, it is suggested that the care risk, once classified as a new social security
risk, can partially be addressed by means of collective bargaining. Within the
gender equality perspective outlined above, the focus is on providing care through
institutions. This strategy takes on a new urgency in the wake of the Covid-19
pandemic: private care institutions may become economically unsustainable after
prolonged closure, rendering institutions set up by collective bargaining a necessary
complement to provision by a public sector that is under strain.
Third, the article examines specific risks arising from EU competition law in
cases in which collective agreements establish care institutions. In the past, social
security institutions established by collective agreements have been challenged
under EU competition law and economic freedoms, raising the question of
whether a restrictive interpretation of those provisions has the potential to prevent
progressive solutions to current problems.
32 Alexandre de le Court, Collective Bargaining on Social Protection in the Context of Welfare State
Retrenchment: The Case of Unemployment Insurance, in Collective Bargaining and Collective Action: Labour
Agency and Governance in the 21st Century? 213 (Julia Lopez Lopez ed., Hart 2019); Natalie et al., supra
n. 31; Ylenia Curzi et al., Getting Flexicurity Right: New Ways to Reconcile Welfare, Flexibility and
Competitiveness in a Post-Crisis Europe, 4(2) Quaderni Fondazione Marco Biagi 31–54 (2015); see also
the other contributions in this issue.
33 Sem Vandekerckhove, Inclusive Growth Through Collective Bargaining, CAWIE research paper 3.1, KU
Leuven (2018).
34 Hans van Meerten & Elmar Schmidt, Compulsory Membership of Pension Schemes and the Free Movement of
Services in the EU, 19 (2) Eur. J. Soc. Sec. 118 (2017); Eva Vanherle, Compulsory Membership: Can It Be
Valid in the Future and Does It Fit with Freedom of Services and Competition Law? (KU Leuven, Faculty of
Law 2019).
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3 PROVIDING UNPAID CARE WORK AS A SOCIAL SECURITY
RISK
Care – for children, older persons, and people who are sick or disabled – was not
among the social risks initially addressed by social security schemes in Europe. This
section discusses whether engagement in unpaid care work is correctly classified as
a social security risk.
3.1 DEFINING SOCIAL SECURITY RISK
The basic risk underlying the provision of social security at the time of industria-
lization was constituted by the emergence of the working classes, who could only
provide for their shelter and sustenance by engaging in paid work.35 Incapacity to
work due to illness, unemployment and old age thus constituted a risk to the ability
to obtain shelter and sustenance. The risks of illness, unemployment and old age (as
a synonym for frailty) were thus the first social security risks. Modern welfare states
go beyond the aim of ensuring mere survival by protecting human dignity in more
wide-ranging ways36 encompassing measures ensuring participation in social life,
cultural activities and access to information. Accordingly, post-industrial social
security37 not only addresses the risk of the loss of income, but also wider risks
relating to the loss of capacity to engage in (employed) work, such as daily
exchanges with other adults while using skills acquired in education that are
deemed to provide a useful contribution to society. These risks are dealt with by
payments in lieu of income, but also by providing institutions and programmes to
avoid the loss of and ensure access to employment.
To avoid an overly complex argument, this definition of the social security
risk conceptualizes the risk of losing the capacity to engage in remunerated work as
external to the employment process. The definition thus disregards the interrela-
tion of conditions of employment and the realization of risks. For example,
working conditions could lead to contracting an illness or induce workers to prefer
unpaid care work over unsatisfactory employed work.
35 Stein Kuhnle & Anne Sander, The Emergence of the Western Welfare State, in The Oxford Handbook of the
Welfare State 61 (Francis G Castles et al. eds, OUP 2010).
36 Marcin Wujczyk, Constitutionalisation of Social Security Rights as the Way to a Social Justice State, in The
Right to Social Security in the Constitutions of the World: Broadening the Moral and Legal Space for Social
Justice vol. I Europe 1, (Alexandre Egorov ed., International Labour Office 2016).
37 Esra Dundar Aravacik, Social Policy and the Welfare State, in Public Economics and Finance (Bernur
Açıkgöz ed., InTechOpen 2019); Giuliano Bonoli, Time Matters: Postindustrialization, New Social
Risks, and Welfare State Adaptation in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 40(5) Comp. Pol. Stud. 495
(2007).
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3.2 THE CARE RISK
Proceeding from this functional perspective, what exactly constitutes the care risk?
Again, for the purposes of simplification, we disregard the person in need of care,
and focus on the perspective of the potential carer, whose capacity to engage in
paid work may be inhibited by providing unpaid care. The aspect of care which
gives rise to the care risk is the need to look after those who are unable to fulfil
their own care needs.38 While there are more aspects to care, this response to care
requires long hours of engagement excluding other (employed) work, as well as
recovery from such work. The care risk arises if an employed person reduces or
gives up employment in order to provide unpaid care. It is created not only by the
need to provide care for children, older persons or people with disabilities, but also
by the absence of care provided through paid employment by professional carers.
The classical way to address the care risk consists of providing leave entitle-
ments: maternity leave, parental leave, paternity leave, carers’ leave. While mater-
nity leave is self-evidently reserved for women, due to the need to safeguard the
unborn child and provide sufficient post-natal rest for the mother, parental leave
and carers’ leave is also overwhelmingly used by women, while paternity leave is a
recent development, and often of short duration.39 As discussed above, these
measures promote work-life balance (or rather the balance between paid and
unpaid labour), but also reinforce traditional gender roles in that they lead
women to provide unpaid care for children and older persons. Substituting unpaid
care by means of the provision of paid care constitutes an alternative to reinforcing
traditional gender roles. This alternative can take two fundamentally different
forms. On the one hand, care can be provided in an institutional setting, such as
a childcare institution or a retirement home. These institutions can be funded
privately or publicly, and this may include funding by social security contributions.
On the other hand, those needing institutional support for care can be given funds
enabling them to employ domestic workers in the home to provide care alongside
other household chores, possibly supported by medical staff visiting on a periodic
basis. This model, sometimes called ‘cash for care’ is more typical for long-term
care,40 but it is also to be found in the childcare sector.41
38 Mary Daly, Care as a Good for Social Policy, 31(2) J. Soc. Pol’y 251 (2002).
39 Supra sub 2.1.
40 On comparative empirical studies on ‘cash for care’ schemes see Barbara Da Roit & Christiano Gori,
The Transformation of Cash-for-care Schemes in European Long-term Care Policies, 54(3) Soc. Pol’y &
Administration 515 (2019).
41 Gender, Equality and Diversity & ILOAIDS, supra n. 11, at 148–150; for a practical example where
Italian legislation of 2012 introduced inter alia a voucher system to pay for childcare in lieu of parental
leave: see Annamaria Simonnazzi, Italy: How Could Industrial Relations Help a Return to Economic and
Social Convergence?, in Towards Convergence in Europe. Institutions, Labour Relations and Industrial Relations
205, 219 (Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead ed., Edward Elgar 2019).
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As discussed above, medium-length maternity leave entitlements accompanied
by compensation for loss of earnings in combination with a comprehensive net-
work of institutions for childcare and care for older persons ensure the highest level
of female participation in the labour force.42 However, the lack of childcare
institutions, or the threat of their insufficient return after the global pandemic,
requires primary attention, as leave entitlements with or without a payment
component are already widely accepted.
4 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE CARE RISK
This section addresses the question of whether and to what extent the care risk can
and should be addressed by collective bargaining. This is by no means a matter of
course. For example, the ILO promotes a state-centred approach to childcare
institutions, envisaging collective bargaining for securing the rights of employed
care workers only.43 First, we ask whether social security provision is a suitable
matter for collective agreements, or other trade union activity. Second, we ask
whether addressing the care risk is a suitable function for collective bargaining or
other trade union activity.
4.1 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND SOCIAL SECURITY
In industrial relations systems where trade unions were set up together with
benevolent and mutual societies, social security stood at the heart of collective
bargaining in the initial phase. These societies used contributions of workers to
support colleagues in need as they became unemployed or ill. This eventually grew
into the Ghent system of wholly trade-union provided unemployment insurance.44
Social insurance as an emanation of ‘corporate self-help’45 represented an inde-
pendent function of trade unions. The method of mutual insurance,46 also known
as ‘service function’,47 complemented collective bargaining, arbitration and ‘legal
enactment’.48 These functions were perhaps never fully exclusive of each other.
Today, mutual insurance has blended into social insurance, which in Europe is
42 Gender, Equality and Diversity & ILOAIDS, supra n. 11, at 83–95, 119–120.
43 Ibid., at 117.
44 Social dialogue remains relevant for Belgian unemployment insurance, see van Tim Rie et al., Ghent
Revisited: Unemployment Insurance and Union Membership in Belgium and the Nordic Countries, 17(2) Eur. J.
Indus. Rel. 125; on the current Swedish system under conditions of fragmented labour markets see
Caroline Johansson, A-kassan och den nya abretsmarknaden, in Labour Law and the Welfare State 169 (Laura
Carlson et al. eds, Författarna och Iustus Förlag 2019).
45 Sinclair & Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, 145 (2d ed., Longman 1902).
46 Ibid., at 152–170.
47 Keith Ewing, The Function of Trade Unions, 34(1) Indus. L. J. 1 (2005).
48 Webb & Webb, supra n. 45, at 171–221, 222–246, 247–278.
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predominantly state-based. However, trade unions as well as employers’ associa-
tions are involved in the administration of social security institutions in many
countries.49
The flourishing debate on occupational social security via collective
bargaining50 should not obscure the fact that occupational social security is not
necessarily a suitable matter for collective bargaining. Provided at company level,
occupational social security constitutes a retainment strategy for the employer.
Non-transferable benefits such as pensions, health plans or childcare tend to act as a
disincentive for employee mobility. The resulting ‘welfare dualization’51 results in
higher levels of entitlement for employees that the company wishes to retain than
for those deemed to be dispensable. This gives rise to the question of whether any
functions of collective bargaining and collective agreements are suitable to legit-
imize collective bargaining on social security.
The classical functions of trade unions can be seen as mitigating structural
imbalances in the labour market. The combination of workers is a means to oppose
the economically driven urge to subsume their entire lives to earning a wage. This
not only serves to achieve adequate wage-work bargain but also ensures that
workers can become involved in the organization of work.52 Multi-employer
collective bargaining in particular can have other functions beyond class conflict.
Its regulatory function consists of laying down rules for the workplace with a
sectoral or even national dimension.53 By removing the price of labour and
working conditions from inter-firm competition, collective agreements provide a
level playing field for employees and employers alike, which can translate into a
surplus,54 or merely a smoother organization of work. Collective bargaining offers
employers and workers alike an opportunity to benefit from the collective knowl-
edge of those closely involved in the work process. This enables the parties to
collective agreements to draft work rules that are not only socially responsible but
also profitable in a sustainable way. Collective bargaining can thus become a source
of innovation.55 Historically, many institutions of labour law have started out as
clauses in collective agreements, and their innovative function thus seems suitable
49 Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Unions and Employers, in The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State 196 (Francis
Castles et al. eds, OUP 2010).
50 See above text around fn. 31–34.
51 Daniel Natali et al., Sixty Years After Titmuss: New Findings on Occupational Welfare in Europe, 52(4) Soc.
Pol’y & Administration 435, 437 with further references.
52 Voices at Work: Continuity and Change in the Common Law World (Alan Bogg & Tonia Novitz eds, OUP
2014).
53 Ewing, supra n. 47, Webb & Webb, supra n. 48; for empirical evidence for the regulatory function see
Susan Hayter et al., Collective Bargaining for the 21st century, 53(2) J. Indus. Rel. 225 (2011).
54 See Franz Traxler, European Trade Union Policy and Collective Bargaining – Mechanisms and Levels of Labour
Market Regulation in Comparison, 2(2) Transfer 287, 289–290 (1996).
55 See again Hayter et al., supra n. 53, at 238–239.
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for addressing new risks. The debate on addressing welfare retrenchment via
collective bargaining also draws on this innovative function, partly seeking to
reconsider how the provision of welfare can be improved if it is based on social
partner involvement.56
4.2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE CARE RISK
The close link between the care risk and the gendered division of labour may give
rise to doubt about whether it is aligned with the class-function of collective
bargaining. If the risk of losing earning capacity due to unpaid care work is
addressed effectively, this strengthens the position of those traditionally providing
unpaid care vis-à-vis the other members of the family. Granting leave entitlements
with some form of income substitution is less intrusive into the family, since
unpaid care is secured alongside the family income until that time. This may be
the reason why the predominant way of addressing the care risk through collective
agreements is by means of leave entitlements or flexibilization of working time.
Addressing the care risk also requires the provision of remunerated care work,
either in care institutions or through domestic workers, or a combination of the
two. Access to childcare institutions provided by employers is viewed as an
element of occupational welfare,57 that is often provided by employers for selected
categories of employees. Providing child care as elements of collective agreements
could avoid the differentiation and potential regulatory effect of such provision.58
After all, addressing the care risk has an element of improving working and living
conditions, which is the overall aim of collective bargaining. Moreover, such
agreements could draw on the innovative function of collective bargaining.
There are arguments to support the ILO position, which favours state provi-
sion of care institutions.59 In particular, the interests of children or those in need of
long-term care are not represented by the trade unions or employers’ associations,
and might thus be neglected in the collective bargaining process. On the other
hand, the interests of employees include the well-being of those cared for, and
collaboration with a variety of community institutions could contribute a further
bulwark against the danger of low-quality provision. For collective agreements, the
provision of paid vouchers for existing care institutions, or institutions set up on a
communal basis constitutes a potential regulatory strategy. Care institutions could
also be provided through the service functions of trade unions. These are strategies
56 Curzi et al., supra n. 32; Natali, et al., supra n. 31; Olga Rymkevich, Overview of the Findings of the
Project, 4(2) Quaderni Fondazione Marco Biagi 55 (2015).
57 Curzi et al., supra n. 32, at 34.
58 Ibid., at 47.
59 Gender, Equality and Diversity & ILOAIDS, supra n. 11, at 117.
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that could be comprised in particular in the innovation function of collective
bargaining.
5 CARE RISK AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER EU LAW
5.1 POTENTIAL OF EU level collective bargaining for care institutions
EU level collective bargaining as one element of collective bargaining in
Europe60 has addressed the care risk: the very first agreement between EU
level employers’ associations and trade unions was on parental leave.61 Its rapid
adoption in less than ten months exemplified the corporatist character of imple-
menting EU level social partner agreements by Directive.62 The modest Parental
Leave Directive was replaced by the more ambitious Work-Life Balance
Directive,63 which the EU level social partners did not endorse. Employers and
trade unions at EU level could also devise model agreements on securing or
establishing (child) care institutions, or on how collective agreements could and
should address interim care crises arising from pandemics, which are likely to
increase. However, given the reluctance around the Work-Life Balance
Directive and the reluctance of the EU Commission to implement EU level
social partner agreements in recent years,64 it seems more fruitful to turn to
opportunities at national level.
5.2 STEPS TOWARDS CARE INSTITUTIONS VIA COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS UNDER
NATIONAL LAW
The suggestion that collective agreements in Europe should include commitments
to provide childcare is not as utopian as it may seem. A study of the Italian case
identified the setting up of social services by collective agreement as a frequent
occurrence in occupational welfare, with a specific demand for childcare or
60 Supra text with notes 2–4.
61 Framework Agreement on Parental Leave between the European Trade Union Congress (ETUC), the
European Centre of Employers and Enterprises providing Public Services and Services of General
Interest (CEEP) and the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) of
14 Dec. 1995, implemented as a Community law instrument by Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3
June 1996 OJ L 145/4.
62 Gerda Falkner, The Council or the Social Partners?, 7 (5) J. Eur. Soc. Pol’y 705 (2013), on the
differentiation between the corporatist and autonomous route see Dagmar Schiek, Europäische
Kollektivvereinbarungen, inTarifvertragsgesetz 264 (W. Däubler ed., Nomos 4th ed. 2016).
63 Supra n. 14.
64 See the documentation on refusing to implement an agreement on occupational health and safety for
hair dressers by Filip Dorssemont & Klaus Lörcher, On the Duty to Implement European Framework
Agreements, 48 (4) Indus. L. J. 571 (2019).
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assistance for non-self-sufficient family members.65 Similarly, a study of collective
bargaining on social risks in the Netherlands identified a significant number of
collective agreements providing childcare support – before employers were under a
statutory obligation to contribute to childcare.66 These are cautious steps, as the
established instruments in collective agreements to respond to care needs consist of
working time rules, options for part-time work or leave entitlements to a greater
extent than required by legislation. However, these established instruments could
constitute a risk to gender equality at work.
5.3 POTENTIAL BARRIERS UNDER EU LAW
EU law is relatively neutral on collective agreements relating to working time,
including limits to daily and weekly working time in order to allow all adults to
contribute to informal care work. While one court ruling found a violation of a
national ban on cartels by strict limits on working time in the banking sector,67
such an approach is not mirrored by the case law of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU). Nor are there any indications that collective agreements
on leave entitlements or bonus payments enabling workers to source care (‘cash for
care’) would be affected. However, the risks emanating from EU competition law
and economic freedoms (EU economic law) intensify in cases in which collective
agreements establish social security institutions.
The following sections provide an overview of the relevant case law and
outline the risks emerging if it were to continue along the present path.
Subsequently, an alternative reading of EU economic law is developed, based on
the constitutional values underpinning the EU.
5.3[a] Collectively Agreed Common Institutions and EU Economic Law – the Position under
Existing and Evolving Case Law
Nearly all the core cases on EU competition law and collective agreements
evolved around common institutions of the social partners established by
collective agreements, more specifically sectoral pension and health care
65 Andrea Ciarini & Silvia Lucciarini, Collective Bargaining and Occupational Welfare in Italy, LI(2)
Economia & Lavoro 143, 149–151 (2017).
66 Mara Yerkes & Kea Tijdens, Social Risk Protection in Collective Agreements: Evidence from the Netherlands,
16(4) Eur. J. Indus. Rel. 369, 375–379 (2010).
67 For example, KG (Berlin) 21 Feb. 1990, U 4357/89, AP 60 to Art. 9 GG (short English summary in
Dagmar Schiek et al., EU Social and Labour Rights and EU Internal Market Law, 38 (European
Parliament 2015)).
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funds.68 EU competition law lays down a ban on cartels (Article 101 Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union - TFEU) and of an abuse of a dominant
market position (Article 102 TFEU), as well as a ban on state aid (Article 107
TFEU), though this has not been applied to collective agreements yet and need
not be considered here.69 State endorsement of collective agreements, in the form
of an extension for general application, may constitute a violation of Article 4(3)
TEU in conjunction with Article 101 or 102 TFEU. CJEU case law has carved
out a limited exclusion for collective labour agreements from Article 101 TFEU,
but not from Article 102 TFEU, though some social security institutions were
exempted from the scope of Article 102 as they were deemed to be services in the
general economic interest (Article 106(2) TFEU).
The Court first established that employees (or their associations) do not
constitute undertakings,70 thus preventing a full doctrinal return to the times
when ring-fencing agreements between workers were criminalized, as well as
agreements between collectives of workers and individual employers or their
organizations.71 However, the EU anti-trust clause, Article 101 TFEU, remains
relevant for sectoral collective agreements. These equate some of the parameters on
which employers could compete as economic actors, enabling the courts to classify
the employers’ associations’ conclusion of a collective agreement as a decision of an
association of undertakings under Article 101 TFEU. In a series of judgments in
1999,72 the Court embraced this view. Instead of exempting collective bargaining
generally from the application of competition law,73 it established a limited exclu-
sion from Article 101 TFEU for collective agreements between trade unions and
employers or their associations, known as the Albany exclusion.74 Accordingly,
68 For more detail see Dagmar Schiek et al., supra n. 67, at 35–44. For references to the extensive
discussion on the Dutch occupational pension system under EU competition law, see Vanherle, supra
n. 34, at 8–17.
69 A pending case on the privatization of the Slovak health insurance system may provide indirect
indications on the matter (Opinion of AG Pikamäe of 19 Dec. 2019, Case C-262, 271/18 P COM and
Slovak Republic v. Dôvera zdravotná poistʼovňa, EU:C:2019:1144).
70 Case C-22/98 Becu EU:C:1999: 419, paras 26–27, on the question whether transport undertakings
using Ghent harbour could be required by law to use recognized dockworkers, whose wages were set
by collective agreement, which also defined the notion of registered dockworkers.
71 Examples include the British Combination Act 1799, which stated that ‘all contracts, covenants and
agreements ( … .) made between any journeymen, manufacturers or other persons (…) for obtaining
an advance of wages (…) or altering their usual hours or time of working’ were ‘illegal, null and void’.
Similarly, the Loi de Chapelier prescribed that ‘it is contrary to the (…) Constitution for citizens with
the same profession s (…) to (..) make agreements among themselves designed to set prices for their
(…) labour’, adding that any such agreements ‘shall be declared unconstitutional and void’.
72 Case C-67/96 Albany EU:C:1999:430; Case C-115-117/97 Brentjens EU:C:1999:434; Case C-219/97
Drijvende Bokken EU:C:1999:437.
73 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee. Competition Concerns in
Labour Markets – Background Note (DAF/COMP (2019) 2), 8 (OECD 2019).
74 The Court later confirmed that this exclusion only applied to collective agreements concluded in
favour of workers, including those falsely declared as self-employed (Case C-413/13 FNV KIEM EU:
BARGAINING AND UNPAID CARE 401
collective agreements do not fall under Article 101 TFEU in so far as they pursue
certain social objectives. Initially this was justified by reference to the overall social
aims of the Treaties and their explicit recognition of collective bargaining (the
present-day Articles 3, 152, 154, 155 TFEU).75 The 2011 AGR2 ruling referred to
those social objectives as ‘intended to improve employment and working
conditions’.76 Thus, the Court has recognized that providing protection against
classic social security risks also improves employment and working conditions,
leading to the exclusion of those collective agreements from the ban on cartels
under EU law.
However, there is a risk that common institutions established by collective
agreement are classified as cartels under Article 101 TFEU. This is illustrated by the
EFTA Court’s Holship ruling of 2016, concerning the activities of the Administration
Office (AO), a pooling agency for dockworkers in a Norwegian port set up by
collective agreement. In line with ILO Convention No 137, the AO was tasked
with ensuring that the priority engagement of dockworkers registered with them was
in line with the collective agreement, by employing dockworkers and hiring more on
temporary contracts if necessary. The EFTAEuropean Economic Area Agreement for
the members of the European Free Trade Area (EFTACourt) Court held that, due to
a ‘combination of a business objective with NFT’s (Norsk Transarbeiderforbund, i.e.
Norwegian Transportworker Union) core task as a trade union’ deriving from its
engagement ‘in the management of an undertaking’ the priority clause as well as the
creation of the common institution were ‘not (…) limited to the establishment or
improvement of working conditions of the workers (…) and go beyond the object and
elements of collective bargaining’.77 This reasoning would make any common institu-
tion of trade unions and employer associations, as well as institutions run by trade
unions, subject to the ban on cartels, if those institutions qualify as establishments
under EU competition law. The Court of Justice of the European Union will soon
have the opportunity to engage with the EFTA opinion in theHolship case: two cases
are pending before the Court on the Belgian Dockers’ scheme.78 The challenge
C:2014:2411). This is relevant for the potential to conclude collective agreements for own-account
workers including those working in the ‘gig economy’ (see Dagmar Schiek & Andrea Gideon,
Outsmarting the Gig-economy Through Collective Bargaining – EU Competition Law as a Barrier?, 32(2)
Int’l Rev. L., Computers & Tech. 275 (2018)), and has recently been questioned in the light of the
European Committee of Social Rights decision No 123/2016 (12 Dec. 2018) on a complaint against
Irish legislation excluding self-employed workers from collective bargaining rights (Michael Doherty
& Valentina Franca, Solving the ‘Gig-saw’? Collective Rights and Platform Work, 49 Indus. L. J. Advance
Art. (2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/indlaw/dwz026). This problem is not addressed here.
75 ECJ Albany, supra n. 72, para. 60.
76 Case C-437/09 AG2R Prévoyance EU:C:2011: 112, para. 29.
77 EFTA case E-14/15, Holship, para. 49–50, see also John Hendy & Tonia Novitz, The Holship Case, 47
(2) Indus. L. J. 315.
78 The case numbers of these references are C-407/19 and C-471/19: neither is yet scheduled for a
hearing.
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focuses on freedom to provide services, which the claimants perceive as unjustifiably
restricted by an obligation to use only registered dockworkers for activities in the
harbours of Zeebrugge and Antwerp. The collective agreement in question has been
extended for general application, and it too establishes a dockworker pool.79 Thus,
should the CJEU follow the EFTA Court for once, the establishment of joint
institutions by collective agreement would risk attracting the wrath of the competition
authorities.
Furthermore, even if a collective agreement is excluded from Article 101
TFEU, a social security institution set up by the same collective agreement could
still obtain a dominant market position and abuse it, thus violating Article 102
TFEU. It may escape that control if it is not an undertaking under EU competition
law. Under the functional notion of an undertaking, a public or non-profit
organization can be deemed to be an undertaking if operating on the same market
as for-profit organizations. As most social security provisions are also provided by
private insurance or institutions (such as hospitals), social security institutions
would normally constitute undertakings. An exception applies if they are organized
on the basis of solidarity and also under state supervision. The first condition is
fulfilled if the institution provides benefits irrespective of the contributions paid, as
is typical for social insurance. A pension fund or health care fund which has been
established by collective agreement can fall under state supervision, if the collective
agreement is extended for general application and at the same time the institution
is integrated into the compulsory national social insurance. As soon as there is an
element of choice, the institution might remain an undertaking. For example, in
the AGR2 case, the parties to the collective agreement could have decided to
replace the providence fund as the manager of their health insurance system, which
was why the Court assumed that they might be an undertaking.80 The health care
fund was classified as an institution providing services of general economic interest
under Article 106(2) TFEU, for which reason the extension of the collective
agreement for general application did not violate Article 102 TFEU in conjunction
with Article 106(1) TFEU.81 Unsurprisingly, the EFTA court in the Holship case
found that the AO constituted an undertaking, though the referring court had not
sufficiently investigated the facts of the case in order to find or exclude a dominant
market position and an abuse of that position.82
79 On the principles underlying the organization of dock work see Patrick Verhoeven, Dock Labor Schemes
in the Context of EU Law and Policy, XIV (2) Eur. Research Stud. 149 (2011); Isabelle van Hiel, Between
Registered and Precarious: Priority of Engagement for Dockworkers in European and International Law, in The
New Foundations of Labour Law, 165 (Kerstin Ahlberg & Niklas Bruun eds, Peter Lang 2017).
80 Supra n. 76, paras 40–65 with reference to previous case law.
81 Paragraphs 73–80.
82 Supra n. 77, paras 84–100.
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Since the risks emerging from Article 102 TFEU have been overcome in a
number of cases, litigants have taken to using Article 56 TFEU (freedom of
services) or Article 52 (freedom of establishment) as an alternative route. This
was encouraged by the infamous Laval quartet,83 in which the Court held that
there is no collective bargaining exclusion from the economic freedoms. The first
case applying this to a collective agreement on occupational social security was
decided in 2010. It related to the question of whether a collective agreement could
specify the institution suitable to supervise a third-pillar pension scheme. While the
Court answered in the negative,84 the AG opinion developed an argument shaping
future case law: the autonomy of the parties to a collective agreement would not
be impacted upon by subjecting them to an obligation to conduct a public
procurement procedure, and to provide transparency in relation to the criteria
decisive for becoming the trustee of the third-pillar pension fund.85 The 2015
UNIS case specified those conditions in relation to occupational health care. The
Court had to rule on a referral by the French Conseil d’État on whether a collective
agreement extended for general application could impose one provider for occu-
pational health care on all artisan bakeries in a region. The CJEU found parallels to
the Albany situation: in both cases, a collective agreement set up a social security
institution. Once the collective agreement is extended for general application, that
body ‘acquires an exclusive right’.86 Transferring principles developed in public
procurement law, the Court concluded that an obligation to maintain transparency
must be complied with: the public authority (not the parties to the collective
agreement) would have to give potentially interested economic actors the oppor-
tunity to become the institution chosen by the social partners. Thus, once an
extension of the collective agreement is applied for, the social partners can no
longer maintain the institution they have set up. Again, the EFTA Court in the
Holship ruling87 proposed a slightly stricter limitation of collective bargaining
rights: a trade union attempting to ensure that a Norwegian branch of a Danish
company complies with Norwegian collective agreements constitutes a restriction
of freedom of establishment. This is in spite of the fact that companies establishing
in another Member State of the European Economic Area (EEA state) can be
83 This term refers to four rulings of the Court relating to posted workers and protection of wages under
national collective agreements and/or legislation (Case C-341/05 Laval EU:C:2007: 809); Case C-
438/05 ITWF v. Viking, EU:C:2007: 772, Case C-346/06 Rüffert EU:C:2008: 189, judgment of 19
June 2008 COM v. Lux C-319/06 EU:C:2008: 350.
84 Case C-271/08, COM v. Germany, EU:C:2010:426, confirmed recently in case C-699/17 Allianz
Vorsorgekasse AG EU:C:2019:290.
85 Opinion of 14 Apr. 2010, EU:C:2010:183, paras 200–230, on transparency paras 215–220.
86 Case C-25 & 26/14, Union de syndicats de l'immobilier (UNIS) & Beaudout Père et Fils SARL, EU:
C:2015:821, para. 34, with reference to Albany (supra n. 72), para. 90.
87 Supra n. 77.
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expected to integrate into the local legal framework. While the Court found that
the national court might find a justification in favour of the dockworker pooling, it
laid down extremely strict requirements for such a justification.88
5.3[b] How Does This Apply to Establishing Care Institutions in Collective Agreements?
In cases in which collective agreements establish childcare institutions for certain
sectors, it is by no means certain that they would be covered by the Albany
exception, as the case law stands. While competition lawyers find it ‘straightfor-
ward’ to establish whether a collective agreement promotes the improvement of
employment and working conditions,89 there are numerous disagreements about
that alleged clarity. An approach more aligned with traditional notions of competi-
tion law would only extend the exception to clauses that do not impact on the
interests of market operators other than employees,90 while a labour law approach
would align with a wider notion of employment and working conditions. Such an
approach encompasses collective agreements regulating the composition of pro-
ducts, the choice of suppliers as well as the requirement that suppliers comply with
collective agreements or environmental considerations.91 The arguments outlined
above for accepting the care-risk as a social security risk lend support to classifying
the provision of care institutions by collective agreements as clauses improving
employment and working conditions. However, care institutions benefit not only
the workers, but also third parties. There is thus a risk that the Court would not
view these institutions as related to working and employment conditions.
The provision of childcare institutions as common institutions on the basis of a
collective agreement could also be challenged on the grounds of violating Article
102 in conjunction with Article 106 TFEU. If a collective agreement is extended
for general application, and as a result the choice of childcare services for parents
and employers is limited, such arguments might succeed in subjecting the collec-
tive agreement to the control of the competition authorities. In any case, a child-
care or other care institution, even if jointly administered by trade unions and
employer associations, would almost certainly constitute an undertaking: care is big
business, and access of those covered by a collective agreement amounts to a
membership construction in the private sector. An abuse of market position
88 Supra n. 77, paras 115–130.
89 Hendrik Nordling, State of the Union: The Applicability of Article 101(1) TFEU to Collective Bargaining
Agreements After FNV Kunsten Media, 14(1) Comp. L. J. 37 (2015).
90 See AG Jacobs in his opinion on Case C-67/96, Albany, EU:C:1999:28, para. 43.
91 Dagmar Schiek & Daniel Ulber, Tarifvertrag und nationales und supranationales Kartellrecht, in
Tarifvertragsgesetz 193, 197 (4th edn, Wolfgang Däubler ed., Nomos 2016).
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would only emerge if the care facilities acquired a dominant market position,
which seems a utopian prospect at present.
As discussed above, this could lead to an attack on the provision as a violation
of freedom to provide services. If collective agreements establish care institutions
for the use of employees in certain sectors, an argument might be raised that
service provision by other care institutions headquartered in other Member States
would be made less attractive. In a similar fashion as in COM v. Germany and
UNIS, an argument could be made that the powers of the parties to a collective
agreement did not include establishing or choosing a certain institution, but only
allowed a process to be adopted to allow bidding for care provision. Whether such
a claim would be raised would obviously depend on the Commission taking the
matter into their own hands, or a chain of care providers challenging their
exclusion from a certain market.
All these consequences could be avoided if collective agreements on mitigat-
ing the care risk were to provide only allocation rights in care institutions provided
by third parties, that are not controlled by the parties to the collective agreements,
possibly even a mix of different institutions. This however presupposes a scenario
in which collective agreements are no longer necessary to address the care risk
because the public and private sector provide sufficient care institutions.
Thus, in a realistic scenario, the regulation modes addressing the care risk that
are most effective from a gender equality perspective are also at the highest risk of
challenge under EU economic law.
5.3[c] Alternative Future Directions
These problems could be overcome if the Court were to reconsider its case law on
the relation between EU economic law and collective agreements, in order to
align it with the human rights guarantees of collective bargaining. The relevance of
human rights has increased since 1999 with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union (CFREU) becoming legally binding in 2009.92 The CFREU
guarantees freedom of association in Article 12, and collective bargaining rights
specifically in Article 28. Since Article 12 CFREU is not conditioned by a
reference to the rights specification in the Treaty, and also mirrors Article 11
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), collective labour rights are
protected in the strongest possible form.93 Conversely, competition law is not
protected by human rights, while the CFREU mirrors the guarantee of economic
92 This is also stressed by Ioannis Lianos et al., Re-thinking the Competiton Law/Labour Law Interaction:
Promoting a Fairer Labour Market, 10(3) Eur. Lab. L. J. 291, 308–309.
93 Schiek et al., supra n. 67, at 83–89.
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freedoms in Articles 15 and 16. Both these Articles protect the right to freedom of
movement and the right to conduct a business only in line with Treaty rights and
other human rights guarantees.
Taking account of the precepts of competition law, the autonomy of collec-
tive bargaining as required by these CFREU provisions can be achieved in two
ways. First, as regards Article 101 TFEU, the construct of ancillary constraints
would allow the alignment traditional competition law precepts with those safe-
guards. After all, collective bargaining agreements are necessary to allow workers to
achieve acceptable working conditions in an autonomous way. The correlative
agreement between employers is necessary to achieve such an aim, in other words,
‘the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of
those objectives’, as the Court stated in the Wouters case, relating to a regulation
adopted by the Dutch Bar Association.94 Any anti-competitive effects of the
collective agreement would constitute ancillary restraints. Such an approach
would be the most elegant way to achieve the immunity of collective labour
agreements from competition law, without preventing the competition authorities
from pursuing the abusive circumvention of the ban of cartels and abuse by
utilizing collective agreements.95
Turning to Article 102 in conjunction with Article 106 TFEU, the reference
to solidarity allows an interpretation which also safeguards human rights require-
ments. As regards limits emanating from economic freedoms, these have been
widely debated ever since the Laval quartet96: since the Charter of Fundamental
Rights for the European Union (CFREU) became legally binding, a constitutional
interpretation of economic freedoms should prevail. Due to the fact that rights
derived from freedom of association (Article 12 CFREU) are protected uncondi-
tionally, these rights condition the use of free movement rights (Article 15
CFREU) and the freedom to conduct a business (Article 16 CFREU). Under
EU law, business must be conducted in a way that presupposes freedom of
association and related rights, such as the conclusion of collective agreements.
Protecting collective bargaining rights would not just become an afterthought in
justifying a restriction of economic freedoms. Instead, economic freedoms would
be interpreted in such ways that collective agreements cannot restrict them, except
in cases in which the collective agreement is abused for the purposes of limiting
economic freedoms.
94 Judgment of 19 Feb. 2002 Wouters C-309/99 [2002] ECR I-1577 EU:C:2002:98, para. 97; con-
firmed in judgment of 18 July 2006 Meca Medina C-519/04 P, EU:C:2006:492, para. 45.
95 Lianos, supra n. 92, at 306; Schiek et al., supra n. 67, at 37.
96 See for a summary Dagmar Schiek, Towards More Resilience for a Social EU – the Constitutionally
Conditioned Internal Market, 13(4) Eur. Const. L. Rev. 611 (2017).
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6 CONCLUSION
Our deliberations confirm that it is not easy to address the care risk as an emerging
and complex social security risk through collective bargaining, even in a relatively
prosperous region such as the European Union. There are considerable obstacles
arising from the practice of collective agreements: while the limitation of working
time is a traditional matter for collective bargaining, strict limitations that are
necessary to allow a true balance of employed work and informal care have been
abandoned by the social partners all over the world. Traditionally, collective agree-
ments have addressed the care risk by providing for long leave entitlements, which
are at best not well compensated. In practice, this means steering unpaid carers
(predominantly women) away from paid employment once care needs arise.
Addressing the regular care risk for employees in ways also promoting gender
equality in employment, however, presupposes creating reliable care institutions,
possibly adapted to sector-specific working time requirements. In the absence of
sufficient public and private childcare in many EU Member States, joint institutions
established via collective agreements would provide respite for active carers, and this
appears to be ever more important with the expected decline of existing (child) care
institutions following their prolonged closure during the Covid-19 pandemic.
In the EU, legal risks from EU competition rules as well as the economic
freedoms may arise, similar to the risks experienced by agencies pooling dock
work. These risks could be overcome by a modern interpretation of EU economic
law, based on the enhanced position of human rights and social values in the EU
Treaties since 2009. However, if a perspective on EU competition law and
economic freedoms prevails that is merely guided by economic integration ratio-
nales, these rules would once again prove disruptive for collective bargaining, even
if compromising innovative responses to the care risk through collective agree-
ments, at a time when the care risk is increasing in the wake of a global pandemic.
The alternative interpretation of EU economic law in line with human rights
and the EU social values is required not only in response to IT-driven develop-
ments, but also in response to risks as longstanding as the care risk. This requires an
interpretation which revives the idea that collective agreements can regulate the
employment relationship beyond wage bargaining. Expanding the field of engage-
ment for collective agreements may have positive repercussions for other areas,
such as the link between working life and environmental protection, or a holistic
approach to resilience against recurrent pandemics. There is no easy way forward
to addressing an emerging and complex social security risk such as the care risk
through collective bargaining, especially if labouring under EU law. However,
forging ways forward may turn out to be rewarding beyond the field of caring for
others.
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